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Retrenchment, conditionality and flexibility – UK labour 
market policies in the era of austerity 
Elke Heins and Hayley Bennett, University of Edinburgh 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The United Kingdom (UK) is a typical example of both a liberal market economy (Hall and Soskice, 
2001) and liberal welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990). From the outset it is important to 
stress that the UK does not fit a framework that distinguishes between an ‘industrial logic’ and a ‘post-
industrial logic’ when it comes to labour market policies and public unemployment benefits as the 
industrial logic was never relevant here to begin with and the crisis did not change this.  
This is not to say, however, that no change in labour market policies has taken place since the crisis. 
The following analysis will first examine the impact of the crisis on Britain and then map the changes 
and continuities in the areas of unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation, active 
labour market policies, training and human capital formation and needs-based social protection for the 
unemployed. The year 2010 represents a key turning point in two respects: it was the year in which the 
full onset of the crisis was felt in Britain, but also when the government changed to a Conservative-
dominated coalition with the Liberal Democrats (in 2015 replaced by a Conservative majority 
government), resulting in a number of significant welfare and labour market reforms.  
We argue that since the crisis the pattern of labour market and unemployment policies has changed 
towards even more flexibility and less income protection despite growing problems of precariousness. 
Many of the existing programmes that aimed at human capital formation have been redefined either as 
a work test or turned into an opportunity for employers to undercut existing employment protection 
legislation and the minimum wage. With the exception of a brief ‘Keynesian’ moment in which the focus 
was on fiscal stimulus and one temporary direct labour market programme was introduced, the 
emphasis has been on ‘deficit reduction’. Rather than seeing the crisis as a turning point, a policy path 
taken since the 1980s was continued. Any ‘old industrial logic’ of income and job protection – that was 
never particularly relevant in the British case in any case – has been further undermined over the 
decades, while any tentative efforts towards social investment–type policies in line with post-industrial 
logic have been cut back. 
 
2. The UK crisis context 
In the United Kingdom the crisis was first and foremost financial in character as British banks have 
been deeply entangled in the international financing system that was negatively affected by the US 
subprime mortgage crisis. Due to the importance of the financial sector and the construction industry 
as well as the strong reliance on credit-fuelled domestic demand – or ‘privatised Keynesianism’ as 
Crouch (2011) put it – the British economy was hit severely after the country’s housing bubble burst 
(Farnsworth, 2011; Barnes and Wren, 2012). Fears of a bank run and collapses of major mortgage 
lenders first emerged in autumn 2007 and were prevented only by major banking bailout packages. 
Within a year, the financial crisis therefore led to an economic crisis (as expressed in rising 
unemployment, see Figure 8.1, and decreasing GDP rates, see Figure 8.2).  
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INSERT FIGURE 8.1 HERE 
Figure 8.1 shows an increase in unemployment from under 6 per cent in 2008 to around 8 per cent in 
2010/11. While the general trend runs in parallel with Europe-wide unemployment figures, the overall 
level was lower in the United Kingdom and in contrast to the EU28 figures the UK was one of the few 
countries in which unemployment rates have declined since 2011. By the end of 2015 it dropped to close 
to 5 per cent (ONS, 2015b). 
However, what looks like a positive labour market development is based on a strong increase in self-
employment. In 2014, 4.6 million people (15 per cent of those in work) were self-employed in their main 
job, a record number in the past four decades. Across the EU, the United Kingdom has had the third 
largest percentage rise in self-employment since 2009 (ONS, 2014a). Importantly, the average income 
from self-employment has fallen by 22 per cent, even more than employee incomes, since 2008/2009. 
Self-employed workers are thus at risk of being less well-paid, but also less secure and unable to obtain 
social security coverage for illness or maternity.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 8.2 HERE 
 
After a huge contraction of the economy in 2008/09 – the economy shrank by 6 per cent between the 
first quarter of 2008 and the second quarter in 2009 – and a temporary recovery in 2010/11, the United 
Kingdom suffered a double-dip recession in 2012 (see Figure 8.2).  By the end of 2014, GDP levels were 
estimated to have been about 3 per cent higher than at the beginning of 2008 (ONS, 2014b).  
The immediate response to the crisis by the Labour government led by PM Gordon Brown represented 
a short ‘Keynesianist’ revival (Clegg, 2010; Farnsworth, 2011). The pre-budget report of November 2008 
included a number of short-term stimulus packages (HM Treasury, 2008) which added to the public 
debt that had already increased significantly due to the rescue measures for several UK banks (see 
Figure 8.3). Importantly, with the exception of the Future Jobs Fund (see below), the stimulus measures 
were not aimed at keeping up employment directly, but consisted of fiscal measures such as a lowering 
of the VAT rate and other tax rate changes. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 8.3 HERE 
 
As the following analysis of different labour market policy instruments will show, this ‘Keynesianist’ 
moment was very short-lived. After the general elections in May 2010, a coalition government was 
formed between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats that put so-called ‘austerity’ in economic and 
social policy firmly on the agenda. 
 
3. Unemployment benefits: Jobseeker’s Allowance  
Labour market policies based on an industrial logic – that is, serving an income replacement function 
for labour market ‘insiders’ – had been eroded long before the onset of the crisis. In fact, it could be 
argued that unemployment benefits were never really ‘insider oriented’ as they always primarily fulfilled 
a poverty alleviation rather than an income replacement function due to the low level of benefits. 
Although Beveridge had originally envisaged that the post-war British welfare state should be based on 
a reciprocal principle, the link between national insurance contributions and benefits had been 
weakened over time. Apart from a period in the 1960s and 1970s when earnings-related supplements 
were available, unemployment benefit levels have been flat-rate and contribution-based benefits 
converged with needs-based assistance (Clasen, 2005).  
Already decades before the crisis the focus of unemployment benefits shifted towards targeted and 
means-tested welfare and tighter controls (Sinfield, 2013). When we compare the expenditure on 
contribution-based benefits with those on means-tested benefits we see how irrelevant the former is 
(Figure 8.4). In 1996–1997 they made up 10 per cent of total social security spending, but only 5 per 
cent in 2014–2015 (Hills, 2015; 26). The decline in contribution-based benefits over time is partly a 
result of the changed character of unemployment (from relatively short durations on average to more 
long-term unemployment) but also of the tightening of contributory and other requirements (Clasen, 
2009).  
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INSERT FIGURE 8.4 HERE 
 
Tellingly, unemployment benefits were renamed Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) in 1996 to emphasise the 
function of seeking new employment rather than offering income support for those who have lost their 
work and subsequent governments have not done anything to alter this (Slater, 2012: 956). JSA is 
separated into two components, a contribution-based and an income-based part, but paid at the same 
basic level. The distinction between contribution-based and means-tested benefits is thus mainly an 
administrative matter, but has little relevance in public perception. Contribution-based JSA can be 
claimed for a maximum of six months by those who meet the eligibility requirements of having worked 
for a minimum of 26 weeks in the two years before claiming benefits and having paid sufficient National 
Insurance contributions. The flat-rate benefit in 2016/17 was £73.10 per week, with a lower rate for 
under-25s (£57.90).  
Although the rates have been increased over the years, the general trend regarding this type of labour 
market policy is slow retrenchment in the form of ‘policy drift’ that had already started under previous 
governments before the crisis. While benefits received by disabled people and pensioners (which are 
protected by a triple lock that makes sure that pensions will increase by whatever is highest – inflation, 
wages or 2.5 per cent) increased from 2013 to 2015 in line with consumer-price inflation (2.7 per cent), 
benefits and tax credits for working age people were increased by only 1 per cent. This typically lower-
than inflation increase is part of the government’s professed aim to ‘ensure the overall affordability of 
the welfare system’ (HM Treasury, 2012: para 1.155). Despite the lack of strong automatic stabilisers 
that maintain demand during economic downturns in the UK welfare system, there was no attempt to 
increase income support for the unemployed in response to the crisis (Clegg, 2010). Working age 
benefits unrelated to having children already fell under the Labour government, despite the effects of 
the economic crisis (Hills, 2015: 23). However, it is important to recognise the existence of ‘functional 
equivalents’. Higher-income and short-term unemployed can often rely on private unemployment 
insurance in the form of mortgage protection plans (Clasen, 2007), as well as non-statutory redundancy 
payments (Clasen, 2009). If we thus want to speak of an insider/outsider problem, then this refers not 
to the effects of public benefits, as in other European countries, but to wider inequalities in types of 
employment: executives and other high-income employees often receive very generous ‘golden 
handshakes’, while other types of employees receive little or no redundancy pay at all.  
 
4. Employment protection legislation  
Overall, the United Kingdom is characterised by a very flexible labour market with the most lax 
employment protection among OECD countries before and after the crisis (Venn, 2009). Importantly, 
employment protection legislation in the United Kingdom was used not to support collective 
bargaining, but to reduce its relevance, as it was seen as a hindrance to ‘flexibility’ (Clasen, 2009: 82). 
After the crisis, minor improvements in protecting employee rights introduced under the Employment 
Act 2002 were reversed again and the OECD EPL index for regular workers decreased in 2013 to the 
pre-2000 value of 1.03 (OECD 2013).  
Since 2010 the Conservative-led coalition/Conservative government have removed or reduced 1,900 
substantive regulations to support employers by removing ‘bureaucratic burdens’ (UK Government, 
2013). The government presented employment protection legislation reform as a necessary response to 
the global crisis and to maintain Britain’s competitiveness. Consequently, many employment protection 
legislation reforms affect workers’ rights. For example, one major reform to employment tribunal 
legislation means that employees now have to wait longer and participate in mediation before 
approaching a tribunal, employers are no longer required to provide supporting evidence for the 
applicant’s case and it is now more difficult for employees to access Legal Aid to support a case (TUC, 
2014). In addition, since 2013 employees have had to pay an upfront fee of up to £1,200, which 
considerably raises the stakes for low-income workers (Phillips, 2013). Redressing cases before an 
employment tribunal has thus become financially risky for employees. 
The government claims that the changes to employment tribunals will save businesses £40 million per 
year (UK Government, 2013). The number of tribunals has been reduced and as a result of the changes 
it is suspected that many employers may find it easier to break employment laws without being held 
accountable through the tribunal system (TUC, 2012; Law Society Scotland, 2014). For example, cases 
have come to light in which redundant workers were rehired by the same company to do the same job 
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for less pay or on less secure contracts (Malik, 2014; Meikle, 2014). There are also claims that regular 
employees are being replaced by people put on unpaid mandatory work placements by the benefit 
agency (HOC, 2012). 
Many of the recent changes to employment protection legislation also reduce the security and rights of 
temporary employees. Many employment rights – such as the right not to be unfairly dismissed or the 
right to redundancy pay – rely on the legal definition of ‘employee’. Since 2010 there has been an 
increase in employment contracts using the term ‘worker’ rather than ‘employee’. In general, workers 
are entitled to the same rights as employees; protection from unlawful deductions, the national 
minimum wage, holiday pay and working time regulations regarding rest breaks, the 48-hour week and 
its opt-out clause. They are also entitled to statutory maternity, paternity and adoption pay. ‘Workers’, 
however, do not automatically have the right to maternity, paternity or adoption leave, the right to 
request flexible working or time off for emergencies. They also do not have the automatic right to 
protection from unfair dismissal, a minimum notice period to terminate their employment or the right 
to statutory redundancy pay. Furthermore, the government has increased the qualifying period of 
continuous employment for unfair dismissal claims to two years (Pullan, 2013). 
On the whole, much employment has become more flexible and less protected since the crisis. There 
has been a significant increase not only in low paid self-employment, but also in the number of contracts 
with no stated working hours. These so-called ‘zero-hour contracts’ are a prime example of the increase 
in flexible labour arrangements as they require individuals to be ready for work but with no certainty 
about how many hours of work (and thus income) there will be from week to week. In 2008 there were 
approximately 143,000 zero-hour workers in the United Kingdom (CIPD, 2013); by the end of 2014 
there were nearly 700,000 (2.3 per cent of all people in employment) (ONS, 2015a).  
Zero-hour workers are extremely vulnerable to poverty or exploitation by employers as they can – like 
all workers – be refused benefits for voluntarily leaving a job. It is therefore difficult for zero-hour 
workers to leave employment when the hours are reduced. Despite these tensions, in the six months 
leading up to April 2013, 27 per cent of Jobcentre Plus advertised vacancies had no guaranteed income 
(HOC Scottish Affairs Committee, 2013; 42). Not only do these entail a precarious position with regard 
to employment legislation, but these staff earned an average of £9 an hour, compared with £15 an hour 
for other employees (Pennycook, et al., 2013). About 25 per cent of workers on zero-hours contracts are 
full-time students, but 70 per cent are in permanent jobs. A total of 26 per cent stated that they would 
like to work longer hours (Pullan, 2013; Work Foundation 2013).  
The government’s recent employment protection legislation reforms are part of a much larger policy 
reform process that seek to increase the flexibility of workers, reduce employment protection and 
legislation, and consequently, for many people, affect the relationship between employment and welfare 
provision. Even without substantial formal changes to employment protection legislation and despite a 
very low-protection starting point, retrenchment has taken place as employment is now even less 
protected than before the crisis and more and more people are being moved into very precarious jobs. 
 
5. Active labour market policies (ALMP) 
The Labour government initiated large-scale activation reforms after 1997, introducing a suite of ‘New 
Deal’ welfare-to-work programmes and, in 2000, creating Jobcentre Plus to act as a ‘one stop shop’, 
coordinating activities between benefit claims, activation and support programmes. These welfare-to-
work programmes also reached out to a range of working-age groups outside the labour market and 
were often administered as part of a new ‘quasi-market’ system (Finn, 2011; Griggs et al., 2014).  
While some of the New Deal programmes incorporated training, wage subsidy and job creation options, 
on the whole this was a work-first, supply-side approach to move individuals into the labour market as 
quickly as possible. Such programmes were introduced during times of better labour market 
performance and provided support for individuals struggling to enter the labour market. The early 
welfare-to-work programmes were also voluntary for most out-of-work groups, although participation 
became increasingly mandatory for the young unemployed and for some long-term unemployed (Finn, 
2011). For particularly deprived areas, the government also introduced place-based programmes 
involving more support options than the national schemes. For example, the Employment Zone (EZ) 
initiatives were aimed at the long-term unemployed in unemployment ‘hot spots’. For people not 
finding work through the New Deal programmes, the government introduced the ‘Step Up’ programme, 
in which participants were mandated onto 12 month national minimum wage employment placements 
(Finn, 2003; Dar and McGuinness, 2014). 
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Most of the New Deal and local programmes were merged into the ‘Flexible New Deal’ in 2008. This 
welfare-to-work programme became mandatory for more categories of claimants and contracted 
providers and Jobcentre Plus (to an extent) complemented mainstream provision with special support 
programmes. However, on the whole the government did not amend ALMP programmes in response to 
the crisis; instead, reforms were in line with strategies devised pre-crisis (Slater, 2012; McKnight 2015).   
Expenditure on ALMP even under the Labour government had increased only modestly (Clasen, 2009). 
The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government then abolished most place-based funds, 
cancelled existing activation programmes and increased the ‘marketization’ of activation programmes 
by making them even more target-based than they were before. The biggest change has been the 
introduction of the ‘Work Programme’ in 2010 to replace the ‘Flexible New Deal’. Participation is now 
mandatory for most groups of claimants, including long-term health benefit claimants and lone parents, 
who previously had been seen as having ‘legitimate’ reasons for being out of work.  
While the previous Labour government planned a similar large scale welfare-to-work programme 
reform (‘Flexible New Deal’ phase 2), the Coalition’s changes have since led to a number of changes to 
the services offered to jobseekers. First, the Work Programme is delivered predominately by private-
sector organisations and contracts follow a ‘black-box’ approach whereby providers design and include 
whatever services and training they consider suitable for jobseekers (Bennett, 2011; Mirza-Davies, 
2014). The government therefore no longer outlines specific training and human investment 
requirements and most Work Programme providers do not offer accredited training for jobseekers. 
Second, the amalgamation of programmes has led to a decoupling of locally provided, publicly funded 
training provision from the mainstream welfare-to-work activity that some jobseekers previously 
accessed to supplement mainstream welfare-to-work support (Bennett and Clegg, 2013). Finally, 
alongside the Work Programme the government introduced new conditionality measures and 
toughened the sanctioning regime. In this way, the Work Programme not only lacks funding for and 
political interest in social investment initiatives, but it is also embedded within a more punitive system.  
The government has introduced a swathe of programmes that require jobseekers to undertake 
particular tasks and Jobcentre Plus may sanction those who do not comply. On top of a renewed 
Jobseeker’s Agreement, which sets out what a claimant has agreed to do to find work, some individuals 
may be mandated to take part in the new ‘Help to Work’ scheme that entails either visiting the job centre 
daily or taking up ‘community work placements’ comprising work-related activity for the benefit of the 
community for up to 30 weeks (CAB, 2015; McKnight, 2015). There is also a separate ‘Work Experience 
Programme’ that is voluntary to join, but becomes compulsory once the claimant has accepted a place 
offer. The Mandatory Work Activity Scheme, introduced in 2010 and delivered by private organisations, 
provides (unpaid) work or work-related activity for up to 30 hours a week over a four-week period. 
Overall, these new measures seek to ‘correct’ job-seeking behaviour and, in some cases, adopt a ‘work 
for your benefit’ approach (Dar and McGuinness, 2014). A final notable change is that the Jobcentre 
Plus portfolio of services for jobseekers has been reduced as part of the general cuts across the public 
service. Due to recent reforms to benefit administration, such as an increase in conditionality, Jobcentre 
Plus has become a benefit administrator only, emphasising its controlling rather than supportive 
function. 
Overall, we see an increased turn towards mandatory ‘workfare’ in the provision of national activation 
programmes. Supplementary ‘enabling’ social-investment type policies delivered through Jobcentre 
Plus are being cut back or left out of contract requirements to reduce costs. This is particularly the case 
in England, as we will highlight in the next section. 
 
6. Training and human capital formation 
Leaving training mainly to employers, the United Kingdom has never had a strong public tradition in 
this policy area. In the early 1980s a range of programmes – including job creation schemes – were 
introduced to address rising unemployment, but after a short expansionary phase these were scaled 
back again in the late 1980s and the focus shifted from training for adult unemployed to providing work 
incentives and subsidising work experience for the long-term unemployed (Clasen, 2009). 
As outlined above, most UK activation and employment programmes implemented since the economic 
crises are ‘work first’ and mandatory in nature. An exception to this was the ‘Young Person’s Guarantee’ 
(YPG). The YPG was introduced in the 2009 Budget and involved the creation of temporary, full-time 
(25 hours per week) jobs undertaking work of ‘social benefit’. All young people (aged 18–24) 
unemployed for 12 months or longer would be guaranteed a job, the opportunity of work experience or 
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work-focused training. The YPG was formally introduced in January 2010 and operated until March 
2011 (Harari 2009).  
A notable part of the YPG was the Future Jobs Fund (FJF), a £1 billion fund to provide up to 150,000 
guaranteed jobs. As an explicit crisis measure, the FJF was a temporary job creation scheme designed 
in response to concerns about the long-term effects of rising youth unemployment. The Labour 
government thus acknowledged that for some people unemployment was a demand-side issue requiring 
job creation policy responses. The DWP therefore provided funding to subsidise temporary paid jobs 
lasting six months for young people and those living in disadvantaged areas. Long-term unemployed 
young people were also offered a number of other options: sectoral routes, which involved training in 
specific sectors (those with growing employment) with employer support, participation on a 
Community Task Force (which involved work experience placements), work-focused training, 
assistance with self-employment or provision through the New Deal for Young People in specific areas 
(DWP, 2012). However, within the context of a growing punitive discourse from the Conservative Party 
in opposition, the Labour government later announced that all those in the 18–24 age bracket 
unemployed for over 10 months were required to participate in one of the options offered under the 
YPG (Harari, 2009). In the event of failure to do so, participation in a Community Task Force became 
mandatory, with the possibility of benefit sanctions (DWP, 2012). In 2010 the new government 
extended the fund by one year, to provide an additional 200,000 jobs at an extra cost of £300 million, 
but then abolished it, citing high costs. By the close of the programme in 2011, 105,220 temporary 
employment positions were filled (Fishwick et al, 2011), 85 per cent of which were in the 18–24 age 
group (DWP, 2012).  
Excluding the FJF, the government did not introduce notable training and human development 
initiatives. On the contrary, driven by the austerity agenda, funding and resources for this policy area 
have since been reduced. For example, large-scale reductions to public service spending included a 20 
per cent reduction in the further education budget for adults during the spending review period of 
2014–2015 (HM Treasury, 2010). However, mapping changes in this policy area is not straightforward. 
The governance structure of adult learning and training programmes is complex and involves a range 
of central government departments, devolved administrations, government agencies and ad hoc 
initiatives. This is a historical arrangement and has changed little since 2010. Support for the 
unemployed, including training and skills as part of the work-first activation agenda, is the remit of the 
DWP in England, Scotland and Wales and the responsibility of the Department for Social Development 
(benefits) and the Department for Employment and Learning (training and skills) in Northern Ireland, 
whereas training, education and skills policies are arranged independently from the provision of ALMP 
for the unemployed. Efforts by the previous Labour government to link adult training services provided 
through the Skills Funding Agency and local colleges under the remit of the Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills (BIS) with the activities of Jobcentre Plus under the remit of the DWP have not been 
followed through by the coalition government (Goerne and Clegg, 2013). 
The fragmented picture is further complicated as training provision and lifelong learning are devolved 
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. There is no room to cover all the initiatives and programmes 
before and after the crisis throughout the United Kingdom so here we focus only on England.  
Since 2010 there has been a large increase in programmes that involve mandating benefit recipients 
and young people into ‘work experience’ positions or schemes that involve working for an employer. 
However, most do not pay the statutory minimum wage and participants are not legally classed as 
‘employees’. For young people this includes the new ‘Sector Based Work Academies’, the ‘Young 
People’s Work Experience Programme’ and a new ‘Traineeships’ scheme. The government have 
portrayed these three initiatives as ‘skills development and human investment’ schemes, despite the 
limited certified training provision and low (if any) pay scales. The coalition government did not share 
the previous policy ambitions regarding social investment through state-funded skills and training. 
Instead, the new strategy highlighted the ‘shared responsibility’ for skills, with employers and learners 
being asked to contribute to the costs (CESI, 2014). Specific loans are offered to fund learning and 
training administered through private banks that must be paid back by learners once they achieve a 
specific wage level (Mirza-Davies, 2014: 5). Supplementary training programmes previously offered by 
Jobcentre Plus have been replaced by mandatory work activities outlined in the previous section and 
‘flexible’ funding at the discretion of local Jobcentre Plus offices (CAB, 2015).  
Human capital building is now taking place primarily through apprenticeships. Well before the crisis, 
in 2000, the Labour government revived the traditional apprenticeship scheme under which 
apprentices could access part-time education and training, were employed by a particular firm and 
received a small weekly wage. The ‘Modern Apprenticeship’ scheme targeted all young people and 
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offered employers financial assistance if they took on apprentices. In addition, a pre-apprenticeship 
scheme, Entry to Employment, was introduced for individuals with low educational attainment who 
might not normally be able to access an apprenticeship place. In 2005/2006 alone the government 
spent £920 million on apprenticeships and £181 million on the Entry to Employment programme. 
However, these figures are comparatively low in comparison with other labour market tools. 
Apprenticeship starts represented just 1 per cent of the working age population between 2005 and 2010, 
rising to 2 per cent in 2010–2012/13 and reverting to 1 per cent in 2013/2014.  
Despite the lower number of apprenticeship starts in 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 compared with 
previous years, apprenticeships continue to play a central role post-2010. There are nearly three times 
as many apprenticeship starts in 2014/15 than ten years earlier. However, through a number of reforms 
the human investment and skills training aspect of apprenticeships has been diluted. Programme-led 
apprenticeships, delivered mainly by further education colleges, have been discontinued (Hodgson and 
Spours, 2011) and in their place employers are encouraged to take responsibility for the design of 
apprenticeships. Post-2010, the majority of people starting apprenticeships work in the low-paid service 
sector rather than the traditional manufacturing sector (Mirza-Davies, 2015: 1), raising questions about 
the long-term outcomes of recent apprenticeships. There has also been a threefold increase in the 
number of apprenticeship starts by people aged 25 and over between 2009/10 and 2013/14 (ibid: 5), 
nursing suspicions that these are not serving the aim of human capital building, but simply constitute 
a cheap hiring option for employers.   
Available figures on apprenticeships indeed give reasons for concern. Data from 2010/2011 show that 
‘workplace skills training for adults has fallen by 275,400 places, suggesting that employers have simply 
shifted their workers onto apprenticeships to continue getting government funding’ (Lanning, 2012). 
There is also significant variance regarding the quality and pay of apprenticeship places; for example, 
56 per cent of engineering apprentices receive off-the-job training compared with only 24 per cent of 
retail apprentices; apprentices in construction are earning 32 per cent more than their counterparts in 
other sectors (DfE and BIS, 2013; 17). The lack of definition and variable training and pay rates can be 
used by employers to circumvent the statutory minimum wage requirements as the minimum hourly 
rate for apprentices is lower than for regular jobs. Alongside the reforms to the apprenticeship schemes, 
the government also introduced a separate ‘Traineeship’ programme as a supposed pre-step to the 
apprenticeship scheme. While it provides funding and support to employers, trainees are exempt from 
receiving the already low apprentice minimum wage. In practice, therefore, apprenticeships are often 
exploited by employers as a way to undermine the minimum wage, while focusing less on human capital 
formation.  
As a consequence of the retrenchment of these types of policies in England and their continuation under 
devolved governments, we find increasing regional differences, including the centrality of social 
investment ideas.  
 
7. Needs-based social protection for the unemployed 
While we will focus on means-tested unemployment benefits in this section, it is important to bear in 
mind that the non-contributory support system for unemployed in the United Kingdom is complex and 
consists of a vast array of further means-tested benefits and allowances. Means-tested JSA amounts to 
the same flat-rate payments as contributory JSA, with an additional rate for couples. It can be claimed 
by anyone of working age and out of work who was employed over the past two years but was exempt 
from paying National Insurance contributions due to low wages; as well as by those who have exhausted 
their six months of contribution-based JSA or who have not worked over the past two years. A limit is 
set for private savings and a partner must work less than 24 hours per week on average. Claimants 
themselves must not work more than 16 hours per week on average.  
This income-based JSA is linked to activation. The New Deals since the late 1990s have expanded the 
definition of a ‘working-age adult’ to include previous ‘outsiders’, such as lone parents,  the disabled or 
people from difficult backgrounds, each with different expectations regarding their activation efforts 
(Griggs et al., 2014). This emphasis on ‘work as the best route out of poverty’ is closely linked to a ‘make 
work pay agenda’ that offers wage subsidies in the form of child and working tax credits as an incentive 
to work instead of benefit increases in order to tackle so-called ‘welfare dependency’ (Wiggan, 2012; 
Deeming and Smyth, 2014).  
The consensus on the issue of ‘welfare dependency’ as well as the focus on supply-side labour market 
policies had emerged in the 1990s (Clasen, 2005), but the discursive problematisation was increased by 
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the Conservative-led government. As already mentioned, since 2010 benefit increases have been below 
inflation. In addition, a weekly benefit cap has been introduced that prescribes a maximum amount that 
can be received when claiming a number of combined benefit, allowances and tax credit types. This cap 
is set at £500 for couples with or without children and single parents and at £350 for individuals without 
children or not living with their children. Furthermore, the eligibility criteria for receiving income-based 
JSA were tightened and the plan is to replace it with the so-called ‘Universal Credit’ that is gradually 
rolled out across Great Britain. The term ‘universal’ refers to the fact that it combines various different 
low-income household benefits; it is still means-tested and subject to sanctions. 
Under the Welfare Reform Act 2012, claimants can now find their benefits suspended for up to three 
years if conditions are not met. Even single parents or lead carers in a couple with a child aged one to 
four have to partake in ‘worked-focused interviews’ to keep in touch with the labour market.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 8.5 HERE 
 
Nearly 15 million sanctions have been issued against recipients of JSA since 2000, half of which have 
been in the six years since 2010. A total of 47 per cent (nearly 4 million) have been implemented (Figure 
8.5). June 2010 to July 2014 was the peak period for JSA sanctions, with an average of 136,500 referred 
and over 640,000 sanctions applied each month during this period. More recently, sanction levels have 
dropped, mainly due to other agencies better supporting appeals and making job seekers more aware 
of their rights and claimant commitments. 
The reforms also entail that less recognition is afforded to special needs, with the exception of the 
severely disabled. Regarding disabled claimants, so-called work capability assessments have become 
stricter and many were denied access to better benefits for health-related claims (Employment Support 
Allowance, ESA). Disabled ESA claimants are now exposed to increased conditionality and sanctioning 
(Figure 8.6). Despite a recent fall in total referrals and an improvement in appeals processes, since the 
introduction of the new regime in 2012 on average over 1,900 sanctions were applied each month to 
people in receipt of ESA.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 8.6 HERE 
 
 
8. Discussion  
Overall, it is difficult to classify the United Kingdom in terms of its labour market pattern according to 
the framework suggested in this book, given that so much is mingled together under needs-based 
assistance, activation and social investment – particularly because activation can have two sides, the 
incentivising ‘carrot’ and the punitive’ stick’. Morel et al. (2012) distinguish between different ‘worlds’ 
and Bonoli (2009) between different ‘varieties’ of social investment regimes, while Deeming and Smyth 
(2014) differentiate between the Nordic ‘heavy’ (where ‘old’ social spending on protection is coupled 
with ‘new’ social spending on prevention through human capital building, see Kvist, 2015) and the 
Liberal ‘light’ social investment strategies (which combines a focus on productive human capital 
investment with low social protection). Already before the crisis, the United Kingdom’s social 
investment strategy clearly corresponded to a Liberal light model.  
This does not mean that there have been no changes. A key characteristic of the UK welfare provision 
since the 1990s is a work-first orientation as unemployment benefits and active labour market policies 
have become more closely linked than previously (Clasen, 2009). There is a clear tendency for the aim 
of employment growth to be promoted at the expense of, rather than as a complement to, the aim of 
social protection (Deeming and Smyth, 2014). The principle of conditionality, stipulating that 
entitlement to welfare benefits should be dependent on satisfying certain compulsory conditions, has 
been creeping steadily into employment policy in Britain since the Thatcher era (Peck, 2001). A main 
aim was not only to reduce unemployment, but to tackle the wider problem of ‘worklessness’ (Wiggan, 
2012) and to widen the categories of people to be ‘activated’. This activation had over time less to do 
with enabling social investment and took on an increasingly punitive character. 
Under the Labour governments until 2010 we could still discern active labour market programmes and 
human capital investment that represented a ‘social investment type’ (Bonoli, 2009) as new training 
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programmes and strategies were devised to promote employability and to increase the job-readiness of 
unemployed workers (Paz-Fuchs, 2008; Lindsay et al., 2007). However, already then the 
residualisation of public welfare benefits and a trend towards a rather punitive workfare state that 
attempts to enforce work for all had begun (Deeming, 2014). This can be illustrated with two DWP 
commissioned reviews of UK welfare-to-work policies: the so-called Freud report was published under 
the title ‘Reducing dependency, increasing opportunity: options for the future of welfare to work’ 
(Freud, 2007). At the beginning of the recession another review of conditionality in the welfare system  
recommended a new regime of ‘personalized conditionality’ with the objective of moving as many 
working-age benefit recipients as possible into work in order to ‘avoid long-term benefit receipt and 
protect the taxpayer’ (Gregg, 2008: 10). Social attitude surveys correspondingly indicate a longer-term 
hardening of attitudes towards redistribution and welfare (Park et al, 2012).  
Despite the weakness of automatic stabilisers in the liberal British welfare state and the clear structural 
character of unemployment during the global crisis, this route of welfare-to-work, which mainly blames 
the workless individual for not trying hard enough or not having the ‘right attitude’ to find work, was 
continued. The retrenchment of income protection for various working-age benefit claimants has even 
accelerated through not protecting the real value of unemployment benefits, the introduction of a 
benefit cap as well as increased conditionality. Under the Work Programme now even mandatory 
unpaid labour can be stipulated as a condition for continued benefit receipt for the long-term 
unemployed. At the same time, the ALMP reforms and the reduction and amalgamation of Jobcentre 
Plus managed training and employment support means that human capital development initiatives 
have been drastically reduced. There is now even less ‘carrot’ and even more ‘stick’. The term of ‘social 
investment’ is not even used in England anymore, although it is important to recognise differences in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland because training is a devolved responsibility. 
Furthermore, an increase in the low-income self-employed and zero-hour workers point to an 
increasing flexibilisation and precarisation of large parts of the labour market. Various developments 
in the use of nominally ‘human capital forming’ initiatives such as apprenticeships signify a large-scale 
replacement of at least somewhat secure jobs falling under standard minimum wage regulation by jobs 
that even undermine the already low standards of the British labour market regime. 
While the United Kingdom’s headline employment figures may not demonstrate that the crisis created 
a large labour market problem, when combined with changes to employment protection legislation, the 
rise of precarious work and the lack of welfare support for such workers, it is clear that deep-seated 
labour market transitions are taking place. Instead of the crisis being an instigator of path reversal 
towards strengthening either protection or social investment, the dominant logic of a low security 
welfare state has been maintained and the groups being affected by the harsh realities of living in a 
liberal welfare state have increased. Rather than speaking of ‘insiders and outsiders’ in relation to the 
public benefit system, it would be more apt to conclude that UK working age-adults are increasingly all 
becoming unprotected outsiders as both existing welfare rights and support to find decent employment 
are cut back. If we want to use the insider/outsider terminology, then this is best applied in relation to 
the corporate sphere, in which some individuals depending on their skills, sector or company are able 
to negotiate ‘golden handshakes’ and other attractive redundancy packages. 
Table 8.1 gives an overview of the policy areas that have experienced retrenchment or expansion and 
assesses whether the nature of activation policies has shifted towards enabling or more punitive forms.  
 
INSERT TABLE 8.1 HERE  
 
Labour market policies that are typically classified as protecting incomes and jobs have never followed 
a replacement principle in the UK social security system but merely fulfil a poverty alleviation function. 
The low benefit levels were further reduced through non-indexation to wages or prices while 
employment protection was further deregulated. We furthermore see a clear increase in conditionality 
(complemented by harsher sanctions) and a reduction in social investment (in England). Needs-based 
social protection has always been the main policy focus due to the means-tested and low-benefit 
approach of the British welfare state. However, also here we see a retrenchment as there is a renewed 
discourse on ‘deservingness’ that implies delegitimising unconditional public support for parents with 
young children, some disabled and chronically ill people, with work being the preferred route over 
welfare. 
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9. Conclusion 
The financial pressures and increased risk of unemployment created by EU austerity have led to even 
less protection and increased retrenchment of labour market and unemployment policies in Britain. 
While the crisis in the United Kingdom is mainly a banking and private debt crisis, the main focus of 
the UK government has been on deficit reduction and this has led to widespread public sector and 
budget cuts, including labour market programmes and support for jobseekers, an increase in sanctions 
and new conditionality for a wider range of working-age adults.  
While a recalibration of policies from an industrial logic to a post-industrial logic is typically connected 
to some ‘modernising compromises’ (Bonoli, 2003) and trade-offs between policies, the non-existence 
of ‘insider’ benefits makes any package deals difficult if not impossible. The fact that there is no strong 
advocacy for social investment or protection due to the weakness of trade unions adds to this problem. 
There is also no substitute for the residual protection provided through statutory EPL or JSA in the 
form of collective agreements.  
It is difficult to disentangle the effects of the crisis from the effects of a changing government ideology, 
beginning with the Thatcher governments from 1979 onwards. The Labour governments after 1997 
introduced some measures that acted as carrots rather than sticks but they also tightened the benefits 
regime for several types of ‘workless’ working-age adults. However, while there was then at least some 
attempt to create ‘equality of opportunity’ and to support jobseekers with training and employment 
experience, under the Conservative-led coalition from 2010 and then the Conservative government 
from 2015 labour market policies have become overly punitive with discourses attacking a ‘something 
for nothing’ or ‘welfare dependency’ culture. The government has used the crisis as an opportunity to 
argue that ‘there is no alternative’ to deficit reduction and cutting back the welfare state. Instead of 
seeing enabling active labour market and human capital formation policies as a social investment, these 
are regarded as a cost factor and now mainly serve the functions of a work test. Employment protection 
legislation, wider social protection measures and minimum wages have been eroded or undermined for 
the sake of ‘employer-friendliness’ and supply-side economic policies. 
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